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SUSAN JAFFE ROBERTS, DAVID L. BARRACK, DAVID B. CHARME, ROBIN PHELAN, AND
JORDAN BAILEY*
This article addresses developments in international secured transactions and insol-
vency during 2011. Although many developments took place around the world, because
of space limitations, this article is limited to developments in the United States and Great
Britain.
I. United States
A. RECENT LEHMAN BROTHERS DECISION CAUSES CONSTERNATION IN CAPITAL
MARKETS AND SHOWS Luvurrs ON THE REACH OF CoMiTY IN U.S.
BANKRUPTCY COURTS
A recent decision by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York
(Bankruptcy Court) has caused concern in the international capital markets and unease in
the structured-finance markets. In a result that is diametrically opposed to a U.K. Su-
preme Court decision affirming the enforceability of Noteholder Priority provisions in a
swap agreement, the Bankruptcy Court, interpreting the same provisions in the same
agreement, found such provisions to be unenforceable. In doing so, the Bankruptcy Court
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in In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., held that it could not extend comity to a decision
rendered by England's highest court.1
1. Background
In 2002, the predecessor to BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd. (BNY) entered into a
principal trust deed with Dante Finance Public Ltd. Co. (Dante), "pursuant to which a
multi-issuer secured obligation program (the Dante Program) was established." 2 Under
the Dante Program, Saphir Finance Public Limited Company (Saphir), "a special purpose
entity created by Lehman Brothers International (Europe), issued various series of credit-
linked synthetic portfolio notes", that were secured by collateral. BNY held the collateral
in trust for the benefit of Saphir's creditors, which included Perpetual Trustee Co. Ltd.
(Perpetual). 3
A supplemental trust deed governed each series of notes and each trust deed made ref-
erence to a swap agreement. 4 Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc. (Lehman Special)
was a party to certain swap agreements with Dante.5 Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.
(Lehman Holdings), the parent company of Lehman Special, provided credit support to
Lehman Special for each swap agreement. 6 All of the transaction documents were gov-
erned by English law.
Each swap agreement contained provisions that modified payment priorities in the
event of a default. If there was no default, Lehman Special's rights in the collateral were
senior to and took priority over those of Perpetual. But in the event of a default by Leh-
man Special, payment priorities would be reversed such that Perpetual would receive pri-
ority over amounts otherwise payable to Lehman Special.7 "The events of default under
each of the Swap Agreements include the bankruptcy filing of any party."8
On September 15, 2008, Lehman Holdings filed a voluntary Chapter 11 petition, fol-
lowed by Lehman Special's filing on October 3, 2008.9 Perpetual thereafter sought to
continue its right to a senior priority payment pursuant to the terms of the swap agree-
ment and filed suit against BNY in the English High Court of Justice, Chancery Division
(High Court).1° Lehman Special subsequently intervened in the litigation."
After a trial, the High Court, relying on principles of U.K. contract law, issued a judg-
ment holding that Lehman Special's interest in the collateral securing the swap agree-
ments was "always limited and conditional," and thus payment to Perpetual as a priority
1. Lehman Bros. Special Fin. Inc. v. BNY Corporate Tr. Servs. Ltd. (In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc.),
422 B.R. 407, 413 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010).
2. Id. at 413.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 410-11.




10. Id. at 411. On Dec. 1, 2008, Saphir sent notices to Lehman Special terminating the swap agreements,
designating that: (i) the filing by Lehman Special of a Chapter 11 petition was an event of default and (ii) Dec.
1, 2008 constituted the early termination date under section 6(a) of each ISDA master agreement. Id. at
413-14.
11. Id. at 411.
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noteholder did not violate the anti-deprivation principle under English law.' 2 The High
Court also noted that Perpetual's status as a priority noteholder became effective on Sep-
tember 15, 2008, the date on which Lehman Holdings filed its petition for Chapter 11
bankruptcy.1 3
The Court stated that "the modern tendency has been to uphold commercially justifia-
ble contractual provisions which have been said to offend the anti-deprivation rule."14
While the court acknowledged that the anti-deprivation rule is designed to prevent parties
from depriving the bankrupt of property, which would otherwise be available to creditors,
it found that the matter involved a complex commercial transaction entered into in good
faith. It was also persuaded by the absence of any suggestions that the provisions were
intended to evade insolvency law.' 5
While the English litigation was still pending, on May 20, 2009, Lehman Special (along
with Lehman Holdings and affiliated creditors) filed an adversary proceeding against BNY
in the Bankruptcy Court seeking a declaratory judgment that the modification provisions
in the swap agreement constituted unenforceable ipso facto clauses. 16 The Bankruptcy
Court's decision did not extend comity to the Court of Appeal's decision and, instead,
applying U.S. bankruptcy law, reached a decision 180 degrees opposite from that of the
English Courts.
2. Applicable Law
U.S. Bankruptcy Code sections 365(e)(1) and 541(c)(1)(B) render unenforceable ipso
facto clauses that modify a debtor's interest in a contract solely because of a bankruptcy
filing. 17 "The safe harbor provisions of section 560 of the Bankruptcy Code protect a
non-defaulting swap participant's contractual rights to ... liquidate, terminate, or acceler-
ate" a swap agreement because of the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor and
the commencement of a bankruptcy case. 18
12. Id. The anti-deprivation rule is a principle of U.K. insolvency law under which a contract term cannot
operate to deprive creditors of an asset that the company had immediately before the onset of insolvency. See
Belmont Park Invs. PTY Ltd. v. BNY Corporate Tr. Servs. Ltd., [2011] UKSC 38, 1.
13. Id. Lehman Special appealed the High Court's judgment to the Court of Appeal, Civil Division (Court
of Appeal), which affirmed the High Court's decision. The U.K. Supreme Court affirmed the appellate
decision. Id. at 412.
14. Id. at 33.
15. Id. The court also noted that it was "possible to give [the anti-deprivation rule] a common sense appli-
cation which prevents its application to bona fide commercial transactions which do not have as their pre-
dominant purpose, or one of their main purposes, the deprivation of the property of one of the parties on
bankruptcy." Id. at 33-34.
16. Lehman, 422 B.R. at 411. Lehman Special also sought a declaratory judgment that any action to modify
Lehman Special's right to priority of payments as a result of its bankruptcy filing violated the automatic stay
under Bankruptcy Code § 362(a). Id. at 415. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. Id. at
411-12.
17. Id. at 415. Section 365(e)(1) bars enforcement of provisions in a contract that would cause the contract
or any right or obligation thereunder to be terminated or modified solely because of a provision in such
contract that is conditioned on "the commencement of a case" under 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(1). Id. (citing 11
U.S.C. § 365(e)(1) (1991)). Similarly, section 541(c)(1)(B) provides that a debtor's interest in property be-
comes property of the estate notwithstanding any provision in an agreement that is conditioned on the com-
mencement of a case under 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1)(B). Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1)(B) (2010)).
18. Id. at 421.
SPRING 2012
256 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
The court addressed several issues in rendering its decision: (1) whether, as of Lehman
Special's filing date (the second filing date), Lehman Special had any rights that could be
protected by the ipsofacto clauses (or whether it had lost such rights upon Lehman Hold-
ings' bankruptcy filing); (2) whether the Noteholder Priority provisions were enforceable
under the safe harbor protections provided in section 560 of the Bankruptcy Code; and (3)
whether the Noteholder Priority provisions constituted enforceable subordination
agreements.
The most significant issue that the court addressed (though one which neither party
raised in their arguments) involved whether Lehman Special's priority rights were pro-
tected from the moment of Lehman Holdings' bankruptcy filing. The court addressed
whether "even if LBHI's [Lehman Holdings'] petition date [the first filing date] were to
be considered as the operative date for a claimed reversal of the payment priority ... the
ipsofacto protections ... would bar the efficacy of such a change in distribution rights."' 9
BNY argued that the Bankruptcy Court must defer to the English courts' determination
that the Noteholder Priority provisions became effective as of the first filing date, such
that the property right claimed by Lehman Special was already lost before it commenced
its own bankruptcy case.20 Next, BNY argued that even if the provisions did not take
effect prior to the Lehman Special's petition date, "they nonetheless are enforceable as
part of an integrated 'swap agreement' that qualifie[d] for the safe harbor protections" in
section 560 of the Bankruptcy Code.2' Finally, BNY maintained that the Noteholder
Priority provisions constituted enforceable subordination agreements.22
Lehman Special argued that the Noteholder Priority provisions were "unenforceable
ipso facto clauses that inappropriately modifqied] a debtor's interest in a contract solely
because of a bankruptcy filing in violation of Bankruptcy Code sections 365(e)(1) and
541(c)(l)(B)." 23 Moreover, Lehman Special argued that any attempt to modify its pay-
ment priority violated the automatic stay provision under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3). 24 Finally,
Lehman Special argued that the "safe harbor" provisions of the Bankruptcy Code did not
prevent the Noteholder Priority provisions from being rendered unenforceable.2 5
3. The Bankruptcy Court's Decision
The court rejected BNY's argument that Lehman Holdings' petition date (the first fil-
ing date) automatically triggered a reversal in payment priorities, finding its position to be
inconsistent with'the structure of the transaction documents. The court observed that
when determining whether a debtor's interest in an executory contract is property of the
estate (as of the date that it commences its bankruptcy case), courts look to the transaction
documents to see whether termination requires the non-debtor party to undertake some
19. Id. at 418-19.
20. Id. at 418. This argument suggests that BNY likely did not anticipate that the court would concede the
Lehman Holdings filing date as the operative date for a reversal of priorities, but nonetheless hold that
Lehman Holdings' filing constituted a "commencement of a case" for purposes of triggering the ipso facto
protections for Lehman Special.
21. Id. at 421.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 414.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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post-petition affirmative act.26 The transaction documents at issue required BNY to take
certain affirmative acts before any modification of payment priority took effect. BNY,
however, only took such acts after Lehman Special had already commenced its case.2 7
Thus, the court found that Lehman Special "held a valuable property interest in the trans-
action documents as of the LBSF [Lehman Special] Petition Date" that deserved protec-
tion as part of the bankruptcy estate. 28
While the court could have decided Lehman Special's priority rights on that basis
alone, it went further, insisting that Lehman Special's priority rights would be protected
even if Lehman Holdings' filing had triggered a reversal in payment priority. In doing so,
the court created an entirely new interpretation of the reach of ipso facto protections.
The court reasoned that in certain situations it was appropriate for one debtor to invoke
ipso facto protection due to the filing of another affiliated member of a corporate family.29
Noting that Lehman's various corporate entities comprise an "integrated enterprise" and,
as a general matter, "the financial condition of one affiliate affects the others," the court
held that "the chapter 11 cases of LBHI [Lehman Holdings] and its affiliates is a singular
event for purposes of interpreting" the language of "the ipsofacto provisions that speak in
terms of the commencement of 'a' case." 30 Thus, Lehman Holdings' commencement of
its case entitled Lehman Special to claim the protections of the ipsofacto provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code. 3'
The court also held that the Noteholder Priority provisions were not entitled to safe
harbor protection. 32 Additionally, it rejected BNY's argument that the Noteholder Prior-
ity provisions constituted enforceable subordination agreements. 33
4. Implications
The Lehman Brothers decision is important because it demonstrates, perhaps, the extent
of comity in international litigation. It is also interesting because the U.S. and English
cases were pending at the same time, yet the courts still reached opposite conclusions. To
be sure, the Bankruptcy Court carefully limited its holding to the unique situation that
arose from the sequential bankruptcy filings of "perhaps the most complex and multi-




29. Id. at 419-20.
30. Id. at 420.
31. Id. Moreover, the court observed that any attempt to enforce the modification provisions would violate
the automatic stay, which is triggered upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition and prevents the taking of any
property of the estate. Id. at 420-21.
32. Id. at 421. The court found that the provisions at issue were not contained within the relevant swap
agreements, noting that such agreements contained no reference to the supplemental trust deeds or the note-
holder priority provisions. Id.
33. Id. The court noted that BNY "cannot overcome the shifting nature of the subordination that is being
activated by reason of a bankruptcy filing," concluding that "the shift in payment priority upon the com-
mencement of a bankruptcy case renders unenforceable this aspect of the subordination agreement." Id. at
421-22.
34. Id. at 420.
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holdings create uncertainty as to whether parties to agreements and contracts may be
subject to differing interpretations of those agreements and contracts.
B. Lv RE ToFs. MANIFESTLY CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY
OnJuly 22, 2011, U.S. BankruptcyJudge Allan L. Gropper for the Southern District of
New York issued an opinion in the Chapter 15 case of In re Dr. fiirgen Toft.3s The Bank-
ruptcy Court declined to grant recognition to a German administrator because the "order
of recognition on the terms requested would be manifestly contrary to U.S. public pol-
icy." 36 The phrase "manifestly contrary to public policy" is found in 11 U.S.C. § 1506
and is viewed as a narrow exception to be applied sparingly in light of Chapter 15's pur-
pose of providing a means for cross-border cooperation in insolvency matters, founded on
the pervasive theme of international comity.
1. Factual Background
In early 2010, several creditors of Dr. Juirgen Toft filed a bankruptcy petition in the
Munich District Insolvency Court (the MDIC) hoping to collect debts owed by Toft. The
MDIC appointed Dr. Martin Prager as insolvency administrator to investigate Toft's af-
fairs and attempt to locate Toft's assets. Toft had extensive business interests but proved
to be uncooperative and evasive. He began selling estate assets without the MDIC's per-
mission, thus squandering the opportunity for his creditors to receive any sort of recovery.
When Prager began locating assets, Toft fled, first to England and then to Asia. In an
effort to prevent further loss of estate assets, Prager obtained orders in Germany and
England that allowed Prager to intercept Toft's postal mail and email, providing informa-
tion for Prager's investigation. 37
. Once Prager learned that two of Toft's email accounts were stored on servers by two
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) located in the United States, he filed a Chapter 15 peti-
tion for recognition of a foreign main proceeding with the Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of New York.38 Along with the petition, Prager sought ex parte interim
relief in the form of a court order allowing him access to the two U.S. email accounts as
well as the redirection of future emails to these accounts. 39 In response, the court re-
quested supplemental briefing from Prager on the availability of such an order under U.S.
law.
2. The Bankruptcy Court's Decision
In support of the requested interim relief, Prager urged application of the principle of
comity and argued that the court should enter an exparte order similar to the German and
English orders already obtained and grant Prager access to Toft's email accounts. 40 The
court held that the requested relief would be manifestly contrary to public policy because
35. In re Toft, 453 B.R. 186, 188 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011).
36. Id. at 201.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 189.
40. Id. at 191.
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disclosure of Toft's emails would violate the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, a
bankruptcy trustee would not be entitled to such relief, and Chapter 15 relief cannot ordi-
narily be obtained without notice to the debtor.41
Chapter 15 was adopted to provide a process for recognizing and giving effect to for-
eign insolvency proceedings. Typically, the petition is short and simple, and once a for-
eign main proceeding is recognized, certain relief is granted automatically, leaving a
foreign representative to request further relief if so desired.42 Underlying all aspects of
Chapter 15 is the principle of comity.43 Section 1506, however, limits a court's ability to
grant relief under Chapter 15 where such relief would be manifestly contrary to the public
policy of the United States. The Toft court analyzed several cases and determined that the
public policy exception of section 1506 is limited to "fundamental principles of law, in
particular constitutional guarantees." 44 Furthermore, the court concluded that inclusion
of the word "manifestly" is meant to restrict the use of section 1506 to "exceptional cir-
cumstances concerning matters of fundamental importance." 45
In re Qimonda AG Bankruptcy Litigation was one of the cases the court analyzed. 46 In
Qimonda, the court addressed whether granting comity to a provision of German insol-
vency law, which terminated the rights of a patent licensee, would be manifestly contrary
to public policy. The German law conflicted with 11 U.S.C. § 365(n), which gives an
intellectual property licensee the right to (i) treat a contract that has been rejected by a
debtor-licensor as terminated or (ii) retain its rights under the contract for the duration of
the contract. After Toft was published, the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia issued an opinion in Qimonda on remand that explained that the public policy
exception to granting comity to applicable foreign law must be limited to the most funda-
mental policies of the United States.47 Accordingly, to be manifestly contrary to public
policy, foreign law must either (i) be procedurally unfair or (ii) severely impinge upon a
U.S. statutory or constitutional right in a way that would offend the most fundamental
policies and purposes of such right. The Qimonda bankruptcy court held the German
termination provision to be manifestly contrary to U.S. public policy because a failure to
apply section 365(n) would severely impinge upon an important statutory protection ac-
corded licensees of U.S. patents and stifle technological innovation.
Although some consider Qimonda a close call due to the high threshold of manifestly
contrary, the ruling in Toft is grounded on demonstrable non-bankruptcy statutory law and
principles. In Toft, the court began with the Wiretap Act and the Stored Communications
Act, each a sub-part of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (the Privacy Act). 48
The Wiretap Act imposes criminal and civil penalties on a person who intentionally in-
41. Id. at 189, 196.
42. Id. at 189-90.
43. 11 U.S.C. § 1509(b)(3) provides that following recognition of a foreign proceeding, "a court in the
United States shall grant comity or cooperation to the foreign representative." Comity is the recognition of
one nation's legislative, executive, or judicial acts by another nation. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64
(1895). Comity is not mandatory, but is not a mere courtesy. Id.
44. Id. at 194.
45. Id.
46. See id. at 195 (citing In re Qimonda AG Bankr. Litig., 433 B.R. 547 (E.D. Va. 2010)).
47. In re Qimonda AG, No. 09-14766-SSM, 2011 WL 514983, at *14-15 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Oct. 28, 2011)
(mern. op.).
48. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522, 2701-2712.
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tercepts electronic communications. 49 More important, the Privacy Act is a legislative
manifestation of a fundamental body of law that has created what many refer to as the
right to privacy. The court'found that allowing Prager secret access to Toft's email ac-
counts would compromise Toft's right to privacy, which is protected by a comprehensive
statutory scheme founded on the fundamental rights protected by the Fourth Amendment
and many of the states' constitutions.50
The court next looked to the powers typically granted to a representative of an estate
under U.S. law. Prager sought the right to inspect Toft's email accounts by pointing to (i)
the broad nature of Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2004; (ii) case law supporting a
bankruptcy trustee's ability to obtain a court order to search an uncooperative debtor's
home; and (iii) cases that allowed a bankruptcy trustee to intercept a debtor's postal mail. 51
The court rejected the parallels in each instance. While Rule 2004 is broad and the exam-
ination permitted under the rule may be commenced by an ex parte motion, the proce-
dures do not remain secret once an order is entered. Additionally, in the context of
emails, the plain language of the Privacy Act provides procedures that allow for "wire-
taps," which are only available to law enforcement officials and, in most instances, are only
available to those parties who can obtain a search warrant under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 41(a).52 A bankruptcy trustee is not one of those parties. Finally, the court
pointed to differences between each of the cases allowing a trustee to inspect a home or
intercept postal mail and the secret nature of the relief Prager requested. In each case, the
debtor either was notified prior to the inspection of the home or the mail or other mea-
sures were taken to maintain privacy interests. 53 Prager's request did not include these
safeguards.
The court last addressed Prager's request to refrain from providing notice to Toft. The
court noted that Bankruptcy Rule 2002(q) was specifically included to require notice in
Chapter 15 cases; thus, presumably only a rare situation would allow for the court to
disregard Rule 2002(q).54 The court decided this was not such a situation.
The court found that under all three principles, privacy, powers of estate representa-
tives, and notice, not only would the requested relief be contrary to U.S. law, but it would
be manifestly contrary to public policy to grant such relief. In contrast to the German and
English rulings, the U.S. court denied Prager's motion for ex parte relief in its entirety.55
II. United Kingdom
In a decision that overturned common law on enforcement of default judgments in the
United Kingdom, the High Court of Justice Court of Appeal (Court of Appeal) held that a
proceeding in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, an ad-
versary proceeding, and default judgments arising from that proceeding should receive
recognition and enforcement without the need for any additional proceedings. Prior to
49. Tofi, 453 B.R. at 197 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 251 1(1)(a)).
50. Id. at 198. The Privacy Act protects both aliens and U.S. citizens.
51. Id. at 198-200.
52. See id. at 198-99.
53. Id. at 199-200.
54. Id. at 200.
55. Id. at 201.
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the decision in Rubin v. Eurofinance SA, many foreign defendants chose not to appear and
defend actions brought against them because of the impediments to enforcement of de-
fault judgments. The Court of Appeal's decision puts the benefits of creditors in bank-
ruptcy cases and the concept of universalism ahead of defendants' desires to play
jurisdictional games. Defendants are on notice to appear and defend certain claims
brought against them in foreign adversary proceedings.
A. BACKGROUND
The Consumers Trust (TCT) was a British trust created by Eurofinance SA, a British
Virgin Islands company governed by English law and owned by a British citizen (Adrian
Roman). The trust was created to carry on a sales promotion scheme in the United States
and Canada known as the "cashable voucher programme." 56 Merchants who participated
in the program offered their customers cashable vouchers with the products or services
that they sold, promising to pay within three years a rebate of up to 100% of the purchase
price for the product or service as long as the customer met certain conditions (described
by the court as a "complex" and "obscure" process).57 The scheme eventually ended when
Missouri's attorney general brought proceedings against TCT that resulted in a settle-
ment involving a payment by the trustees of $1.65 million and $200,000 in costs.58
Thereafter, Eurofinance decided to end the program. Because as a business trust TCT
was not recognized in the United Kingdom as a separate legal entity, it decided to file a
Chapter 11 petition in the United States.5 9
During the pendency of the bankruptcy proceeding, the receivers initiated adversary
proceedings in the Bankruptcy Court against a number of parties, including
Eurofinance. 60 Upon advice of counsel, defendants decided not to submit to the jurisdic-
tion of the Bankruptcy Court and not to defend the proceedings brought against them.61
On July 22, 2008, the Bankruptcy Court granted default judgments against the defend-
ants. Shortly thereafter, the receivers applied to the English High Court of Justice, Chan-
cery Division to enforce the Bankruptcy Court's order granting summary judgment. The
appeal was rejected.62
B. APPLICABLE LAW
Under the English rules regarding conflicts of laws, 63 a court in the United Kingdom
will only recognize and enforce a foreign court's judgment where the foreign court ob-
56. Rubin v. Eurofinance SA, [2010] EWCA Civ. 895, [3]-[41 (appeal taken from EWHC).
57. Id.
58. Id. 6.
59. In order to initiate the proceedings under Chapter 11 in the U.S., Eurofinance applied to the High
Court for David Rubin and Henry Lan to be appointed as receivers for TCT. Id. 1 7. Shortly thereafter, the
receivers filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 in the Bankruptcy Court. Id.
60. Id. I 11. See Rubin v. Roman (In re The Consumers Trust), Ch. 11 Case No. 05-60155 (REG), Adv.
No. 07-03138 (REG), slip op. at 2, 26-28 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2008).
61. Id.
62. Id. T 14. The receivers thereafter appealed to the Court of Appeal.
63. Id. 33 (quoting Rule 36 in DicEY, MoRIS & COLLINS, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (Sweet & Maxwell
eds., 14th ed. 2006)).
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tained personal jurisdiction by showing either the defendant's physical presence in the
foreign court's jurisdiction or the defendant's voluntary submission to the court. 64
The issues in the case before the Court of Appeal involved: 1) recognition of a U.S.
bankruptcy proceeding as a foreign main proceeding; 2) recognition of litigation within
that case, called an adversary proceeding; and 3) enforcement of the default judgment
rendered by the Bankruptcy Court.
The foreign representatives of TCT argued that the rules regarding conflicts of laws do
not apply to cross-border insolvency because "by virtue of the principles of universality
and assistance, the English court must recognise [sic] and enforce the exercise of jurisdic-
tion of a foreign court, not over the person himself, but over the foreign insolvency pro-
ceeding itself and all that forms a part of that proceeding." 65
C. THE COURT OF APPEAL'S DECISION
The Court of Appeal held that: (1) a U.S. bankruptcy case constitutes a foreign main
proceeding; (2) litigation brought in a related adversary proceeding is part of that foreign
proceeding; (3) the ordinary rules for enforcing foreign judgments in personam do not
apply to bankruptcy proceedings; and (4) a monetary default judgment against a British
Virgin Islands company and British citizens is entitled to recognition and enforcement in
England without any additional proceedings on the merits.66
The Court of Appeal stated that the judgments of the Bankruptcy Court made in the
adversary proceedings are "judgments in and for the purposes of the collective enforce-
ment regime of the bankruptcy proceedings" and thus entitled to "worldwide recogni-
tion." 67 According to the court, such judgments are governed by "the sui generis private
international law rules relating to bankruptcy and are not subject to the ordinary private
international law rules preventing enforcement of judgments because the defendants were
not subject to the jurisdiction of the foreign court."68 The court also held that ensuring
that a bankruptcy proceeding receives worldwide recognition requires the court's active
assistance, which includes enforcing the orders made by the Bankruptcy Court against the
defendants.69
D. IMPLICATIONS
The decision in Rubin places foreign defendants in all common law jurisdictions on
notice that it is now possible for a court to recognize and enforce default judgments
against them under principles of universalism. The impact of this decision has already
spread to major bankruptcy proceedings. At least one bankruptcy judge in the U.S. has
relied on the decision and asked for assistance from a court in Gibraltar to enforce a
64. Id.
65. Id. 'T 39.
66. Id. 9J 61-63.
67. Id. 61-62.
68. Id. 1 61.
69. Id. 1I 62. At the time of this writing, the case is on appeal and is set to be heard by the U.K. Supreme
Court.
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default judgment rendered against several foreign defendants.70 Additionally, the Trustee
for the liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities has filed an intervention
petition in the U.K. Supreme Court to have the Court of Appeal's decision upheld. In-
deed, there are at least two cases in which the Trustee has sought recognition of U.S.
bankruptcy judgments (of $400 million and more than $1 billion) in foreign jurisdictions,
both of which have been adjourned pending the decision of the U.K. Supreme Court. 71
70. In re Bernard L. MadoffInv. Sec. LLC, No. 08-01789, 2010 WL 5072070, at *81-83 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 19, 2010).
71. See Intervention on Behalf of Irving H. Picard, Rubin v. Eurofinance SA, [2010] UKSC 0184 (appeal
taken from EWCA Civ.).
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